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of his car by the permittee, even though it be uncontradicted
(Prickett v. Whapples, 10 Cal.App.2d 701, 703-705 [52 P.2d
972] ), and many times this court h88 affirmed judgments in
favor of the plaintiffs upon testimony as meagre as that which
supports the court's findings in the, presen.t case. (Hicks v.
Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654 [134'P.2d 788] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d
457 [126 P.2d 868].) The application of the rule announced
in those cases that any reasonable doubt should be resolved
in favor of the conclusion by the trier of fact should not be
limited to but one party to an action unde::.- that statute and,
in my opinion, compels agreement with the finding that Corti
was not the agent of Arthur Gigli. Of· course, if Corti was
not the agent of Arthur, then obviously the former's use of
the car at the time of the accident was not Arthur's use, and
the entire structure upon which the majority and concurring
opinions are predicated collapses, as under no theory of construction, could Corti's use then be said to be the one to which
Joseph Gigli had consented.
For these reasons I believe that the judgment should be
affirmed as to both Joseph Qigli and Arthur Gigli.

[So F. No. 16873. In Bank. July 8, 1943.]

MRS. W. A. ALLEN et al., Respondents, v CALIFORNIA
MUTUAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION (a
Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[1] Appeal-Law of Oase.-All questions and issues adjudicated
on a prior appeal are the law of the case upon subsequent appeals and will not be reconsidered.
[2] Id.-Law of Oase-Decisions of What Oourt.-The doctrine
that all' questions and issues adjudicated on a prior appeal
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1317; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 1326; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1337; [4-6,14] Building and Loan Associations, § 16; [7,15] Appeal and Error, § 1329;
[8] Appeal and Error, § 1333; [9,12] Appeal and Error, § 1344;
[10,11] Limitation of Actions,§ 61(6); [13] Equity, § 37; [16]
Appeal and Error, § 1328; [17-19] Building and Loan Associations,
§18.
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are the law of the case applies to decisions of the District Courts
of Appeal after they have become final.
[3] Id.-Law of Oase-Sufficiency of Oomplaint.-Where the sufficiency of a complaint is considered on a prior appeal, the doctrine of the law of the case does not apply if the,evidence does
.
not support the allegations of the complaint.
[4] .Building arid Loan Associationg...-;.Insolvency-Rights of Stockholders-As Investors.-In an action to establish the claims
of holders of certificates of a building- and loan association in
liquidation, plaintiffs proved a case '~ithin the decision ~n a
prior appeal, where it was shuwn that the association and
an agency company fraudulentlY induced them to exchange
their certificates for the company's stock, that they signed
orders for the withdrawal of their deposits, which were credited to the company's purchase of theassoclation's guaranteed stock, that the permits issued to the company by the
Corporation Commissioner were conditioned upon the sale
of stock for cash, but the company received no cash for 'its
stock, and that the permits were tJ.Ot exhibited to plaintiffs
as required by their terms.
,
[5a,5b] Id.-InsolvencY-Rights of Stockholderg...-;.As Investors.In an I,lction to establish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders ?f a building and loan association in liquidation
who had been mduced to exchange their certificates for the
securit,ies of an agency corporation, the holding upon a, prior
appeal that investors who, by reason of fraudulent representations, made tl'ansf~rs ?f their certificates, or amounts represent~d thereby appearmg upon the books of the association,
contlnuedto be lithe owners of their original certificates" and
were entitled to share in subsequent dividends declared' by
the commissioner, ignored the meaning of the Building and
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the. purpose of its enactmelit:
[6] Id.~Insol~ency-Rights of .Stockholderg...-;.Purpose of Statute.
-The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Building and
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the 1935 amendment thereto
(Stats.1935, p.1500; Deering's Gen. Laws 1935 Supp., Act 986)
was to liberalize the statutory requirements for the filing of a
claim in favor of one who, as admitted by the books of the
association, was an investor of the institution at the time it
was taken over by the commissioner.
[7] Appeal-Law of Oase-Erroneous Decisions.-In an action to
establish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders
of a building and loan association in liquidation, whereon a
prior appeal the court erroneously construed and applied, the'
provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act, § i3j6,

i I
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the trial court's determination of plaintiffs' rights, by following the law of the case, did not lead to the result contemplated
by the rule allowing an exception to that doctrine when its
application would lead to an injustice, where plaintiffs had
the same dghts to share in the proceeds of the liquidation of
the association as the plaintiffs in a similar case previously adjUdicated.
[8] Id.-Law of Case-Questions Not Presented.-All questions
presented by the record must be raised upon the first appeal
from an adverse ruling.
[9] Id.-Law of Case-Limitations.-In an action to establish
the claims as investors of certain certificate hoIdel's of a building and loan association in liquidation who had been induced
to exchange their certificates for the securities of an agency
corporation, where defendants in their answer pleaded the
statute of limitations and the trial court granted judgment
on the pleadings, a holding that the cause of action was not
barred by limitations was implicit in the order granting the
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
[10] Limitation of Actione-Commencement of .Period-FraudDiscovery-Notice of Facts.-In an action to establish the
claims of certificate holders of a building and loan association
in liquidation who had been induced by fraudulent representations to exchange their certificates for the securities of an
agency corporation, even assuming that upon receipt of their
stock in the agency corporation the plaintiffs were notified of
the falsity of the representation t.hat they would be entitled
to withdraw their money by the absence of any language to
that effect in the stock certificates, the discovery of such
falsity did not give notice that other representations concerning the company were untrue.
[11] Id.- Commencement of Period-Fraud-Discovery-Notice
of Facts.-In an action to establish the claims as investors of
certain certificate holders of a building and loan association
in liquidation who had been induced by fraudulent representations to exchange their certificates for the securities of an
agency company, the fact that after the company's failure
to declare a dividend some of the plaintiffs endeavored to·
obtain from the company's officers the amount of their invest.
ments or joined a stockholders' committee which employed an
attorney to protect their interests did not compel a holding
that the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time,
where it was also shown that the officers countered the plain.
[9] See 2 Cal.Jur. 966, 967; 3 Am.Jur. 549.
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tiffs' complaints with explanations based upon the economic
depression and that plaintiffs continued to rely upon the good
faith, wisdom and advice of the officers and did not learn that
their stock was valueless until the subsequent adjudication of
the company in bankruptcy.
[12] Appeal-Law of Case-Limitations.-In an action to establish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders of a
building and loan association in. liquidation who had been
induced by fraudulent representations to exchange their certificates for the securities of an agency corporation, assuming
that the process of liquidation, within the meaning of Code
Civ. Proc., § 348, commenced when the commissioner took over
the association, the plaintiffs may not on appeal raise the issue
that the acdon is barred by the statute of limitations for that
reason, where that question was concluded bya prior appeal.
[13] Equity - Laches-Elements-Delay.-Delay alone does not
. constitute laches unless it is accompanied by circumstances
from which prejudice may result.
[14] Building and Loan Associations - Insolvency-Rights of
StockhOlders-Construction of Statute.-The use of the· word
"hereafter" in the 1935 amendment to § 13.16 of the Building
and Loan Association Act expresses a legislative intention
that the amendment should apply to dividends declared after
its effective date, in the assets of associations then in the
·~rocess of liquidation.
.
[15a,15b] Appeal-Law of Case-Erroneous Decisions.~In· an
action to establish the claims as investors of certain certificate
holders of a building and loan association in liquidation who.
had been induced to exchange their certificates for the secu·
rities of an agency corporation, where discussion in the opinion on a prior appeal was based upon. an erroneous assumption
as to the facts, it was obiter dictum and the court w.as not required, by the doctrine of the law of the case, to follow the
prior erroneous interpretation.
[16] Id.-Law of Case-Obiter Dictum.-The doctrine of the law
of the case does not require an appellate court to follow an
interpretation which is clearly obiter dictum.
[17] Building and Loan Associations - Insolvency-Liquidation
Proceedings by Commissioner-Interest.-Where the Building
and Loan Commissioner takes possession of the property~
business and assets of a building and. loan association, ·if the
association is subsequently allowed to resume business as a
,oing concern, it should assume its continuing obligation to

.',
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pay interest upon the deposits of its investors, even as the
period during which its assets were in the t~mporary control
of the commissioner; but, if instaad of restonng the property,
business and assets to the association, the commissioner determines to liquidate them, the right of the. investors to interest
shouid be subject to the principle of equality among creditors.
[t8] ld.-lnsolvency-Liquidation Proceedings by Commissionerlnterest.-':'In the absence of express statutory provision, an
investor in a building and loan association in the proc~ss of
. liquidation by the commissioner is not entitled to the payment of interest on his claim after the commencement of the
liquidation. proceeding, where the assets are insufficient to pay
. the principal of all claims in full.
.
[19] ld•......:lnsolvency-~iquidation Proceedings by Commissioner
-lnterest.,---In an action to establish the claims as investors
of certain' certificate holders of a huilding and loan association in liquidation who hadbeenhiduced to exchange their.
certificates for the securities of an agency corporation, ajudgment for plaintiffs allowing interest to the date of the payment of the claims should be .modified by inserting ,in lieu
thereof a provision for its payment to the date bf the. com"
mencemimt of the liquidation proceedings. (Building and Loan
Association Act, § 13.16.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. Maurice T. Dooling, Jr., Judge assigned.
Modified and affirmed.
Action to establish claims against a building and loan association in liquidation. Judgment for plaintiffs modified and
affirmed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, 1. M. Peckham and
Lenore D. Underwood, Deputies Attorney General, D. T.
Jenkins and Patrick J. Kearns for Appellants.
Frank W. Sawyer and Wm. R. Biaggj for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-So far as the merits of the controversy
are concerned, Allen and those who in the superior court
established their right to share in the assets of California
Mutual Building and Loan Association, are in the same position as the investors. whose judgment against that now insolvent corporation was affirmed in Alexander v. State Call ital
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Co., 9 Ca1.2d 304 [70 P.2d 619]. The association and the
Building and Loan Commissioner,' in appealing from the
judgment rendered against them, do not deny that, by fraudulent representations, the respondentS were induced to. exchange their investment certificates forstor.k of-the State Capital Company, but they contend that (1) the fanIure to file a
claim against the insolvent corporation; (2)· the· statute: of
limitations; and (3) laches, bar any recovery by them.
In their second amended complaint, the respondents alleged
that prior to January 23, 1933, each of them. became, and
still is,an investor in the association by the purchase of an
investment certificate and a deposit of money -which is recorded in a pass book a'ccount and deposit book. 'On that date
the associationwa'S taken over by the Building and Loan
Commissioner for the purpose of liquidation. Four years previously, State Capital Company was organized as an agency
of and for, the purpose of assisting the association in the
transa'Ction of its nusiness. By fraudulent representations of
the association's agents during the period from 1929 to 1931,
the respondents were induced to exchange their; "invest.
ments" for shares of stock of State Capital Company, to their
damage in the' amount of their respective deposits in the
association.
The complaint refers to the respondents not oniy as the
own~rsof building and loan investment certificates but also
as "investors" having "investments" or "holdings"inthe
, association. The record is not specific in identifying the status
of each one of them, but from the findings it may be inferred
that some of the respondents held withdrawable mutual
membership shares and others owned,.investment ,certificates:
(See Martin v. California Mut. B. &; L. As.m~, 18 Ca1.2d 478
[1l6P.2d 71].)
,
When the case was called for trial, before the first witness
was sworn, the appellants objected to the taking of any evidence upon the ground that.the complaint does not state a
cause of action. This objection was sustained, . and judgment
rendered for the appellants upon the pleadings. Later, the
cOllrt granted a motion for a new trial and, upon appeal, its
order was affirmed. (Allen v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L. Assn.,
40 Cal.App.2d 374 [104 P.2d 851].) This court'denied I!, petition for a hearing.
,'"
,
By its decision, the District Court of Appeal held that

,.
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Allen and his associates sued to assert rights as investors,
hence "They were entitled to plead an action to quiet title.
That they have done and more too." A1Elo, said the court,
"The plaintiffs alleged that by the fraudulent representations of the defendant corporation they were induced to exchange securities, issued by the defendant corporation, for
securities of State Capital Company, an agent of said defendant; that such exchange was not based :m any consideration
moving from plaintiffs to defendant; that the defendant corporation still holds the securities which the plaintiffs delivered
to it; and that all of said facts appear on the books and
records of said defendant. In other words they alleged in
effect'that there was merely an exchange in form but not in
fact, and that the transaction was a mere change in the form
of accounts between the plaintiffs and the corporate defendant. Manifestly if these allegations are true, and the defendants' motions admitted the truth thereof, it is clear the plaintiffs are and at all times have been I investors' in the defendant corporation."
Following this decision, there was a trial upon the merits.
The trial court found that, in 1929, the association and the
company launched a campaign for the purpose of obtaining
investments of the one in exchange for the capital stock of
the other. Permits were issued by the Corporation Commissioner for the sale of the company's stock but these were
conditioned upon the requirements that each sale be for cash
and that a copy of the permit be shown to each purchaser.
The respondents would not have exchanged their investments
in the association for capital stock of the company but for
the false representations made by the agents of the company
and the association. Each of the exchanges and conversions
of investments for ,the capital stock was void because the
stock was not issued or sold for cash and, for the further
reasoI)., that no copy of the permit for the sale of stock was
exhibited to the investor. The court also found that the first
cause of action is not 'barred by any statute of limitation
nor are the respondents' rights barred by laches.
From these facts, the court concluded that the -investors who
are the respondents upon this appeal a~e entitled to a judg~
ment decreeing the respective transfers' made by them.: to be
void, and restoring them to their respective status either ,~
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the holder of a pass book investment certificate or as a mutual
shareholder in the amount and as of the date of each exchange
appearing upon the books of the association and the company.
Each of those persons, the court continued, has established
a valid claim, as such investor, against the appellants for the
amount of his investment, the claim to be paid out of the
special trust account and reserve fund of the association's
assets established by the commissioner and in the due course
of the administration of the liquidation proceedings by him.
Judgment was entered accordingly.
The appellants now urge that as the facts fOlmd by the
trial court clearly establish that the respondents did not
appear upon the books of the association as investors at the
time the commissioner took over the association and, under
the applicable statute, only such investors are excused from
filing claims, the trial court erred in rendering judgment for
the respondents. But, in making this contention, say the
respondents, the, appellants are rearguing a question now
res judicata by the decision upon the former appeal.
[1] It is a rule of general application that all questions
and issues adjUdicated on a prior appeal are th,e law of the
case upon all subsequent appeals and will not be reconsidered.
(Wens v. Ll(YJfd, 21 Ca1.2d 452, 454-458 [132 P.2d 471];
Blanton v. Ourry, 20 Ca1.2d 793, 801; [129 P.2d 1] ; Gore v.
Bingaman, 20 Ca1.2d 118, 121-123 [124P.2d 17] ; SecurityFirst Nat. Bank v. Marxen, 19 Ca1.2d100 [119 P.2d 131];
Olayt.on v. Schultz, 18 Ca1.2d 328 [115 P.2d 446] ; Penziner
v. West American Finance 00., 10 Cal.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252].)
[2] This doctrine applies to decisions of the District Courts of
Appeal after they have become final. (Wells v.Lloyd, supra,
p. 488; Gore v. Bingaman, supra, p. 122; United :Dred{j1,'ng
00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 208 Cal.'705 [284P.922); Otten
v. Spreckels, 183 CaL 252 [191 P. 11] ; Hill v. Maryland Oasualty 00., 28 Cal.App. 422 [152 P. 953].) And even when,
upon the second appeal, a court is convinced that 'the prior:
deciSion of a question of law was erroneous, it will refuse to
reexamine that issue in the absence of unusual' circumstarices
leading to injustice or unfairness. (Wells v. Lloyd, 81('pra, p.
484; Gore v. Bingaman, supra, p. 121; Penzinerv. West
American Finance 00., supra; Hoffman v. Southern Paci{""
00., 215 Cal. 454 [11 P.2d 887] ; Newport v. Hatton, 207 Cal.
515 [279 P.134] ; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. 00., 187
22 C.2d-lll

1,

.
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Cal. 144 [201 P. 577] ; Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418 [90 P.
1049] ; see England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 CaL2d
791, 795 [97 P .2d 813].)
Considering the decision of the District Court of .Appeal
for the purpose of determining the extent to WhICh the
law of the .case controls a deterInination of the present controversy, it appears that upon the first appeal, as here; th~
association and the commissioner attacked the respondents
complaint as insufficient to state a cause of action.. S.ince the
respondents alleged that they had exc~anged the.Ir Interests
in the association for shares of the capItal stock In the company, said the appellants, they no longer appeared upon t~e
books of the association as investors, and consequently theIr
claims were, by the express provisions of section 13.16, of
the Building and Loan Act, Stats. 1931, p. 483, as amended,
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 986, barred because of the. failure
to file the required claims with the commissioner. In ruling against this contention, the Distl'ict Court of Appeal
not only held that the complaint states 81 cause of action but
that although they demand damages, "their complaint was
answered and they may be a warded such .relief as comes
within the issues. (Sec. 580, CodeCiv. Proc.) If they establish their claim as alleged, the trial court may find they are
still the owners of their original certificates and, if so, they
will then be entitled to present them to the defendant commissioner and share in subsequent dividends as provided in
Act 986, supra. Section 13.16, paragraph 3, contains this
sentence: 'Any investor, without presenting a claim, shall be
entitled as to any dividends hereafter declared, to share in
such di;idends to the extent, and in the proper relative order
of priorit~, o~ a~y claim sho~n by the bo?k~ of, ~~e association to eXIst In hIS favor agaInst the aSSOCIatIOn. (Allen v.
Oalifornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., supra, p. 379.)
[3] It is true, of course, that if the respondents' evidence
does not prove the allegations of the complaint which was
considered upon the former appeal, the doctrine of the law
of the case does n~t apply. (Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles,
19 Ca1.2d 19, 29 [119 P.2d 1].) And the appellants charge
.that although the findings of the trial court, in terms relate
facts which the District Court of Appeal said were, in effect,
pleaded by the respondents, they aTe not supported by the
evidence.
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It is not necessary to question the appellants' assertion
that the withdrawals of the respondents' investmentsappeared by appropriate entries in the books of the association.
at the time the commissioner took. over the association for the
purpose of liquidation because the former decision clearly
contemplates this situation. Under such circumstances, sald
the District. Court of Appeal, if the respondentswerede~
frauded, they are entitled to a decree declaring 'them still
.to be investors in the association, such restoration being
effective as of the date of the exchange.
. [4] And considering other eVidence which is admitted by
the appellants to be true, it is clear that the respondents have
proved a case within the decision upon the prior appeal:
Thus it is conceded that the company was organized to purchase the guarantee stock of the association then outstanding.
In accordance with this plan, the 8lSsociation and the company fraudulently induced' the respondents to agree to ex-'
, change their. investmentS i:n the aSsociation for the capital
stock of the company. To consummate the transaction, the
respondents were induced to sign orders on' 'the association
. for the withdrawa:l of their deposits. These they delivered
to the stock salesmen together with their pass books. By ap','propriate entries the orders were subsequently credited to
the purchase by the company of the guarantee stock of the
association. And findings that the company did riot receive
any cash for the sale of its stock other than by means of the
credits upon the purch8lSe of the association's guarantee
shares, or that the permits were not exhibited to the respond'
ents as required by their terms, stand Imquestioned.
[5a] The District Court of Appeal concluded that an order sustaining an objection to the introduction of any evidence
upon the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of
action is, in effect, the same as one granting a nonsuit. This
holding places an order which is based upon the construction
of a pleading in the same category as one predicated upon an .
evaluation of evidence. But eliminating that procedural question from present consideration, the court held that those
investors who, by reason of fraudulent representations, made
transfers of their certificates, or amounts represented thereby,
which appear upon the books of the association, continue to
be "the owners of their original certificates." As such owners

484
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they are entitled to share in subsequent dividends declared
by the commissioner.
It is difficult to follow that reasoning. Until 1935, the
Building and Loan Association Act, supra, provided that
"the claim of any investor, appearing upon the books of the
association to be a valid claim," might be presented later
than those of creditors or investors generally. (Stats. 1933,
p. 2719; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1933 Supp., Act 986, §13.16.)
Effective September 15, 1935, "Any investor, without presenting a claim, shall be entitled, as to any dividends hereafter declared, to share in such dividends to the extent, and
in the proper relative order of priority, of any claim shown
by the books of the association to exist in his favor . . ."
(Stats. 1935, p. 1500; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1935 Supp., Act
986, §13.16.) If the District Court of Appeal correctly construed the statute, 8! commissioner endeavoring to liquidate
an association will encounter many practical difficulties. How
may he know whether any particular, person whose name
appears on the books of the association as having been, at
one time, an investor, assigned his certificate by reason of
fraudulent representations, or in a transact.ion in which there
was a failure of consideration, or under other circumstances
which enables him to later attack the trandfer Y And how far
back in time must the commissioner go in scrutinizing the
record of· transfers Y
[6] A fuller consideration of the question than could b&
given in connection with the petition for a hearing in thi!\
court of the prior appeal leads to the conclusion that the
Legislature in 1935, and also by the prior enactment, in.
tended to liberalize the statutory requirements for the filing
of a claim in favor of one who, as admitted by the books of
the association, was an investor of the institution at the time
it was taken over by the commissioner. The purpose of a
claim is to give the commissioner, information concerning
an indebtedness of the institution. If the books of the asso. ciation show the. indebtedness, said the Legislature, the investor should not be required to present a 'claim which duplicates the data on its own records. [5b] But to say that an
investor whose withdrawal order or assignment of the certificate
which evidenced his deposit of money has been recorded on
the books of the association is still an investor according to
those books, ignores the meaning' of the statute and the
obvious purpose of its enactment.
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[7] However, although the District Court of Appeal erro-'
neously construed and applied these provisions of the Building and Loan Act, supra, the trial court's determination of
the rights of the respondents, by following the law of the
case, leads to no such result as is contemplated by the rule
which allows an exception to that doctrine when an applica"
tion of it would bring about an injustice. (See Jtngland v.
Hospital of Good Samaritan, supra, p. 791.) On the merits,
the respondents have the same rights to share in the proceeds of the liquidation as the plaintiffs in the Alexander
case, who similarly exchanged investment certificates or mutual shares in the association for the capital stock of the
company, and it appears that the commissioner has set aside
an amount sufficient to pay their demands, on a pro rata basis,
with those of the judgment creditors in the earlier litigation.
Under these circumstances, as, by the law of the case, the
evidence fully supports the judgment, the respondents are
entitled to restoration to their respective iI],terests as holders
of investment certificates and as mutual shareholders in the
association, and also to the dividends declared in the liquidationproceedings. (Alexander v. State Oapital 00., supra.)
A second point which is urged as a ground for the reversal
of the judgment is the trial court's ruling that the cause
of action is not barred by the statute of limitations relied
upon by the appellants, nor by laches. Assuming that the
claim of each of the respondents appears upon the books of
the company, say the appellants, that record shows him to be
only a former investor, who, because of the alleged fraud,
has a cause of action either for damages or for, restoration
to his former status as an investor. In either case, they insist,
the gravamen of the action is fraud. And, as a stockholder,
each respondent is charged with notice of what was spread
upon the records of the company; therefore, his cause of action is barred by the provisions of subdivision 4 of section
338 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishing 8J three year
period of limitation for the commencement of an action for
relief upon the ground of fraud.
.
[8] As a general rule, all questions presented by the
record must be raised upon the first appeal from an adverse
ruling, as thereafter all matters within the scope of the action
and relevant to the issues will be dMmed to have been con-eluded by the jUdgment. Moreover, in any laterconsidera..
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tion of the controversy, it will be held that the judgment, by
implication, if not directly, has determined all issues related
to the subject matter and raised by proper pleadings. (McCandless v, City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.App.2d 407, 413 [52
P.2d 545] ; Texas Co. v. Moynier, 137 Cal.App, 112, 113 [29
P.2d 873] ; 5 C,J.S., Appeal and Error, §1825, n. 7, p. 1279;
and see Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 202 [99 P,2d 652.
101 P.2d 497] ; Barrow v. Santa Monica B. Sup. Co., 9 CaL2d
601,606 [71 P.2d 1108] ; A.ndrews v. Reidy, 7 Ca1.2d 366,370,
371 [60 P.2d 832] ; Lanktree v. Lanktree, 6 Cal.2d 120,122
[56P.2d 943J; Price v. Sixth District Agricultural Assn., 201
Cal. 502, 511-513 [258 P. 387].) [9] The sufficiency of the
second amended complaint, filedin February, 1936, wasthe substantial issue raised in the prior appeal. It charges that
during the years 1929 to 1931 inclusive, by reason of the
fraudulent representations df the association, the respondents
exchanged their investments in it for stock of the State Capital Company. If it be assumed that the records of a corporation place its stockholders upon notice' to the extent claimed
by the appellants, the complaint does not state a cause of
action but it is not now subject to attack.
Where it appears upon the face of the complaint that
a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, and
the statute is pleaded, a judgment triay be rendered for the
defendant if the case is submitted upon the pleadings.
(W ormouth v. Hatch, 33 Cal. 121; 16 Cal.Jur., Limitation of
Actions, § 212, p. 618.) The appellants, in their answer, have
pleaded the provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as barring the cause of action stated
in the second amended complaint. If, therefore, theappel.
lants' contention as to the notice given by the. corporation's
books is sounCl, the trial court properly entered judgment for
them upon the pleadings. Implicit, therefore, in the order
granting the respondents' motion for a new trial , which was
affirmed upon appeal, is the holding that the cause of action
Pew,
is not barred by the statute of limitations. (McCowen
18 Cal.App. 302 [123 P. 191], Reclamation Dist. No .. 3 v.
Goldman, 65 Cal. 635 [4 P. 676], and see 2 Cal.Jur:, Ap"peal
and Error, § 568, pp. 966, 967.)
[10] Another. reason which is urged as a ground for the
reversal of the judgment, is that the respondents were notified
of the fraudulent misrepresentations upon the receipt in De"
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cember, 1931, of certificates of stock of the State Capital
Company. Immediately upon receiving a certificate of stock,
say the appellants, those who claim to haVE: acted upon the
representations of the association were put on notice that
they had no right to withdraw their money from the company,"
for any such preference would have to bestlited in the stock
certificate..This argument admits the absence from the stock
certificate of any express language that a stockholder might
withdraw his investment in the State Capital Company. But
even if he could be charged with kriowledge based upon the
.statutory requirements, as to form, of a stock certificate, the
discovery of the falsity of the statement concerning a right
to withdraw did not give him notice. that otherrepre.sentatioris
concerning the company were untrue.
;
[11] Nor does the fact that, after,no dividerid was declared"
in .December, i931, .some of the respondents admittedly en-'
deavored to obtain from the company's officers the amount' of
their investments, or that some of them .joined a s~ockholders'
committee which employed an attorney to protect their in-"
terests, .necessarily compel a holding' that the statute of limi.
tations commenced to run as of that date. For the .record
shows that the officers of the association .and the company
"countered the complaints of the" respondents with explanationsbased upon the then current economic ,depression and
promises of prospective earnings. This and other testimony
in the record adequately supports the finding of the trial court
that the respondents continued to rely upon the good faith,
wisdom, and advice of the officers and directors respecting
the two corporations and did not learn that the. stock was
valueless until the adjUdication in bankruptcy of the company in March, '1933, and· the pubIlcatiori two' months later
by the commissioner of the notice to creditors of .the asso.
.'
ciation.
[12] The appellants also rely upon the provision of section
.348 of the Code of Civil Procedure that, when a building and
loan. association has become insolvent. and is in the process of
liquidation, "the statute of limitations shall be deemed to
haveeommenced to run from the beginhingof the process of
liquidation." Since the Building and Loan Commissioner
took over the assets of the California Building and Loan'"
Association in January, 1933, they assert, this action, filed
more than· three years after that date, is barred'bysubdivision
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4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But assuming,
without deciding, that the process of liquidation, within the
meaning of section 348, supra, commenced upon the date of
the take-over by the cOrimlissioner, the appellants may not
now raise the issue that the action is for that reason barred.
For, the complaint shows the facts upon which the appellants'
contention is based, and by their answer the statute now relied
upon was pleaded as a defense. The issue was therefore before
the trial court when it ruled upon the pleadings and is concluded by the affirmance of the order granting a new trial.
[13] Concerning the equitable defense, it is well settled that
delay alone does not constitute laches unless it is accompanied
by circumstances from which prejudice may result. (Alexander v. State Oapital 00., 9 Cal.2d 304, 313 [70 P.2d 619],
Gibson v. Mitchell, 9 Ca1.2d 718, 725, 726 [72 P.2d 740], Security T.& S. Bank v. Southern Pac. R. R. 00., 214 Cal. 81,
88 [3 P.2d 1015], Wolpert v. Gripton, 213 Cal. 474, 483 [2
P.2d 767], Silver Burdett 00. v. State Board of Education,
36 Cal.App.2d 714, 719 [98 P.2d 533].) Here, as was said in
Alexander v. State Oapital 00., supra, "There is no suggestion . . . that the lapse of time resulted in any injury to the
Building and Loan Association, nor has it been made to appear that by reason of lapse of time it is inequitable to enforce
the demands of the respondents." And the unchallenged finding of the trial court is that the commissioner has created a
special trust and reserve fund for the purpose of paying the
respondents' claims should they be declared valid by the ,court.
[14] In 1935, the provision which allowed "the claim of
any investor, appearing upon the books of the association to
be a valid claim, presented after the expiration of the" statutory time, to share in any subsequently declared dividend, was
relaxed to allow an investor, without filing a claim, to share
in any dividend declared after the effective date of the amendment.The obvious purpose of the statute is to protect the
investor whose creditor relation appears without contradiction
upon the books of the association from losing his rig!lt to
share in the liquidation of the insolvent organization's assets
through negligence or inadvertance in failing to file a claim
within the prescribed period. The use of the word "hereafter"
expresses the legislative intention that the amendment should
apply to dividends declared after September 15, 1935, its
effective date, in the assets of associations then in the process
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of liquidation. As the first dividend of the California Building
and Loan Association was declared on December 2, 1935, aI,though none of the respondents filed a claim,each of them is
entitled to share in the first and all subsequent, dividends.
[15a] , But the appellants assert that, under the decision
upon the prior appeal, the respondents are not entitled to
share in any liquidating dividends declared prior to the judgment establishing their claims. In support of their contention,
they refer to the concluding paragraph of the opinion, which
reads: "As the action must go back to the trial court for
further proceedings, it should be stated that we notice the use
of the word 'hereafter' in the statute we have just quoted. It
is evidently a misprint for 'thereafter.' Any other construction would lead to absurd results. To illustrate; let us assume
that since September 1, 1935, dividends have been' declared
and paid as provided in Act 986, supra. The sentence we have
quoted took effect on the date last mentioned. According to
the meaning of said sentence 'as it is written, all sums so paid
would have to be recalled, reapportioned, and these plaintiffs
included. As stated above' that would be Illl absurdity. Construing the word as thereafter instead of hereafter, the sentence has a reasonable meaning. Those who delay in presenting their claims lose their rights to partic~pate in dividends
"theretofore declared and paid, but after their claims have been
presented, as in said sentence provided, they are then entitled
to the rights provided therein."
This discussion is obviously based upon the erroneous assumption that the presentation of a claim by the investor was
still required under the 1935 amendment, and this in spite
of the inclusion of, the words "without presenting a claim" in
. the statute. [16] And the doctrine of the law of the case does .
not require this court to follow an interpretation which is
clearly obiter dictum. [15b] The statement of facts in the discussion, assumed for the purpose of illustrating the necessity of
the court's construction of the statute, presupposed a situation where the commissioner paid out all of the liquidating
dividends accruing subsequent to September 1, 1935, without establishing a reserve or trust account for the benefit of'
the investors who had not filed claims with him, and, consequently, to allow such investors to share in dividends already
apportioned and paid in their entirety to the other creditors
would have required the amounts paid to be recalled and
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reapportioned. But upon trial, the court found that the
commissioner had created a trust account, for the benefit of
the respondents, and had. placed in it a ratable amount of
each of the dividends he had theretofore declared from the
proceeds on liquidation.
After decreeing that the respondents be restored as holders
of passbO'O'k investment certificates in the appellant assO'ciation, the judgment O'rders that each of them recO'ver the
amO'unt O'f such investment certificate account and for costs,
"with interests prO'vided by his, O'r her, O'r their, respective .
investment certificate to' date O'f payment." The appellants
assert that interest is' only payable up to the time O'f insolvency.
[17] When the Building and LO'an CO'mmissiO'ner takes
possessiO'n of the property, business and assets O'f a building
and IO'an assO'ciatiO'n which he deems to' he in an insO'lvent O'r
unsafe financial cO'ndition, his future actiO'n is nO't limited
to the liquidatiO'n and distributiO'n Of its assets, but he may
administer the affairs ·O'f the cO'mpany sO' as to restore, if
PO'ssible, its ecO'nO'mic stability and then consent to' th~ assO'CiatiO'n's resumptiO'n O'fbusiness upon cO'nditions apprO'ved
by him. (Stats. 1931, ch. 269, p. 540; Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 986, §13.11.) If·· the assO'ciatiO'n is allO'wed to' resume
business as a gO'ing cO'ncern, it should assume its continuing
O'bligatiO'n to' pay interest UPO'n the depO'sits O'f its investO'rs,
even as to'. the periO'd during which its assets were in the temporary cO'ntrol of the cO'mmissioner. But,if instead O'f restO'r-'
ing the prO'perty, business and assets to' the assO'ciatiO'n, the
commissiO'ner determines to' liquidate them, the right O'f the
investO'rs to' interest shO'uld be subject to' the usual equitable
principle gO'verning liquidatiO'n, namely, E'qtlality amO'ng creditO'rs. [18] In the absence O'f an express statutO'ry prO'visiO'n uPO'n the matter, an investO'r in a building and IO'an assO'ciatiO'n in the prO'cessO'f liquidatiO'n by the cO'mmissiO'ner is
nO't .entitled to' the payment O'f interest on his claim after the
cO'mmencement O'f the liquidatiO'n prO'ceeding, where .the
assets are insufficient to' pay the principal O'f all claims in
full. (In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Assn., ~5 Ca1.2d 134,
147 [99 P.2d 251J;) U;nder this rule, as the resPO'ndents
alleged and the cO'urt fO'und that the assets and prO'perty Qf
the association UPO'n liquidation will enable its creditQrs and
investO'rs to' receive apprO'ximately 65 cents O'n each dO'liar
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O'wed them, the determinatiO'n cO'ncerning interest is errO'neO'us.
[19] The determinatiO'n O'f the cO'mmissiO'ner to' liquidate
an assO'ciatiO'n, after taking PO'ssessiO'n O'f its prO'perty, business, and assets, is evidenced by the filing O'f an inventO'ry O'f
its assets and the publicatiO'n O'f nO'tice to' all persO'ns having
claims against it,' whether as creditQrs or investors or otherwise, to' prese;nt them within a specified periO'd. (Sec. 13.16.)
But by stipulation O'f the parties, they have agreed that liquidatiQn of the assO'ciatiO'n commenced on January 23, 1933.
Accordingly, the judgment is mO'dified by striking therefrQm
the wQrds "to' date Qf payment" (par. 3) and inserting in
lieu thereQf "to' January 23, 1933," and as sO' modified, the
judgment is affirmed, resPQndents to' recO'ver CO'sts UPQn appeal.
GibsQn, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., CQncurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The majority QpiniQn cO'ncedes
. nQt. Qnly that plaintiffs failed to' present a claim to' the Buildhigand Loan CO'mmissiQner pursuant to' sectiO'n 13.16 Qf the
Building and LO'an AssO'ciation Act (Deering1s Gen. Laws,
Act 986) but that under a prO'per cQnstructiQn,of~ th~ ,Mt
they CQuid not be regarded as investors excusedfrQm pre..
sentfugclaims since their claims did nQt appear. on· the
boO'ks Qf the assQciatiQn. Plaintiffs are thus allQwedto reCQver
without cQmplyfug with the statutQry conditiQns tQrecQvery.
I dO' nO't agree that this paradQx is compeUedby the doctrlD.e
of the law Qf the case.
The first appeal in this actiO'n involved the sufficiency Qf'
the allegatiO'ns Qf plaintiffs' secQnd amended cQmplaint.The
present appeal invQlves the sufficiency Qf the evidence .to' .
supPQrt the findings and judgment. The QpiniQn of the' District Court Qf Appeal Qn the first appeal sets fQrth that paragraph III Qf the secO'nd amended cQmplaint' alleged that
plaintiffs were investQrs within the meaning of sectiQn 13.16
Qf the Building and Loan AssO'ciatiQn Act· (Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 986). It appears that defendants cQntended
that there was an incO'nsistency between the specific allegatiO'n Qf paragraph X of the secQnd amended complaint that
plaintiffs exchanged their interests for shares of stock in the
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State Capital Company; and the general allegations of paragraph III, and that the specific allegation was controlling.
(Little v. Union Oil 00., 73 Cal.App. 612 [238 P. 1066];
Aitken v. Stewart, 129 Cal.App. 38 [18 P.2d 988].) The
court declared that this contention would be perSuasive if
there were no other facts involved. "But there are many
other allegations. The plaintiffs alleged that by the fraudulent representations of the defendant corporation they were
induced to exchange securities, issued by the defendant corporation, for securities of State Capital Company, an agent
of said defendant; that such exchange was not based on any
consideration moving from plaintiffs to defendant; that the
defendant corporation still holds the securities which the
plaintiffs delivered to' it; and that all of said facts appear on
the books and records of said defendant. [Italics added.]
In other words they alleged in effect that there was merely an
exchange in form but not in fact, and that the transaction
was a mere change in form of accounts'between the plaintiffs
and the corporate defendant. Manifestly if these allegations
are true, and the defendants' motions admitted the truth
thereof, it is clear the plaintiffs are and at all times have
been 'investors' in the defendant corporation. We are unable
to say, therefore, that the plaintiffs' complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (40 Cal.
App.2d 374, 378-379 [104 P.2d 851].)
. It is clear from the foregoing that the second amended
complaint was held to state a cause of action not simply because of the alleged fraud, but because all the facts showing
the fraud and showing the exchange to be without consideration and merely an exchange in form, appeared on the books
'and records of the defendant. This allegation that all such
facts appeared on the books and records of defendant relates
to the terms of section 13.16 that an investor need not present
a claim with respect to "any claim shown by the books of the
association to exist in his favor against the association."
Nothing in the record, however, indicates that such facts
appeared on defendant's books and records. The books of
the defendant association showed that plaintiffs ceased to be
certificate holders in the &'ssociation between 1929 and 1931.
The books of the State Capital Company showed that at
about the same time plaintiffs became stockholders in that
company. Plaintiffs do not state the nature of their action,
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but whether it is an action for rescission, for damages, or to
quiet title, the claims asserted did not appear upon the books,
and records of the association. They are therefore harred by
the provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act
relating to the presentation of claims in ~iqri~da~ion.
.
The majority opinion does not rest wIth Its Interpretation
of the opinion of the District Court of Appeal but' extends
the doctrine of the law of the case to issues thlitwere not
considered in that opinion. In the present appeal defendants contend that plaintiffs' rights are barred by the statute
of limitations. The majority opinion holds that'since the
availability of this defense was established by ,the pleadings,
the District Court of Appeal determined that the statute was
inapplicable by holding the pleadings sufficient even though
that court did not mention the statute. It has long been
settled in this state, however, that only issues considered in
the earlier opinion become the law of the case. (Trower v.
Oity and Oounty of San ]j'rancisco, 157 CIl!. 762, 765 [109 P.
617] ; Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418, 421 [90 P. 1049] ; Oen- .
tral Nat. Bank v. Peck, 15 Cal.,App.2d 512 [59 P.2d 599] ;
see Moore v. Trott, 162 Cal. 268, 273 [122 P. 462] ; Mattingly
v. Pennie, 105 Cal. 514 [39 P. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep. 87] ; Oowell v. Snyder, 171 Cal. 291, 297 [165 P. 920] ; Klauber v. San
Diego Street Oar 00., 98 Cal. 105, 107 [32 P. 876].) With
two exceptions, the cases relied upon in the majority opinion
involved res judicata, and the rule announced in relation to
that doctrine has no application to the doctrine of the law
of the case. The first of the two cases not concerned with
res judicata, Texas 00. v. 1I!0ynier, 137 Cal.App. 112 [29 P.2d
873], holds merely that when a judgment ~s r~versed with
directions, the trial court must follow the chrectIons. In the
second, People v. Walton, 10 Cal.App.2d 413 [51P.2d 1117],
the court disposed of a question on the merits, noting that
the opinion on a previous appeal had reached the same result.
The doctrine of res judicata does not require a court to decide
a case on an erroneous basis, as the law of the case does, and
is therefore not so narrowly applied. (Allen v. Bryant, 155
Cal. 256, 258 [100 P. 704] ; see England v. Hospital of Good
Samaritan, 14 Ca1.2d 791,795 [97 P.2d 8]3] ; 2 Cal.Jur. 947.)
It is designed to make a judgment the final determination of
a lawsuit by precluding the parties from presenting the same
cause anew even when they have additional arguments. The
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Schauer, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 17734. In Bank. July 14, 1943.]

[1] Agriculture - Regulation - Agricultural Adjustment Acts.The purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 as
amended in 193~ (Stats. 1.937, p. 2501; Deering's Gen. L~ws,
1937, Act 146), IS to provIde a regulation of intrastate' comme;rce wh~ch will be correlated with the corresponding regulatIon of mterstate commerce in the same commodities.
[2] ~onstitutional Law-Constitut~onality of Statutes-Presump_
tlons':-A:ll pr~sumptions and intendments are in favor of the
constItutIOnalIty of a statute, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of its validity.
[3] Statutes-Amendment-Re-enactment and Republication.C.onst., art. IV, § 24, which declares that no law shall be reVIsed or amended by reference to its title, but that it shall
[1] Federal and State Agricultural Adjustment Acts notes 98
A.L.R.1195; 102 A.L.R. 937; 114 A.L.R. 136. See, also,' 1 Cal.Jur.
873; 2 Am.Jur. 416.
[2] See 5 Cal,Jur. 628; 11 Am.Jur. 776.
[3] See 23 Cal.Jur. 682.
.Mc~. Dig. References: [1,8, 13-15] Agriculture, § 4; [2] ColistItutIOnal. La~, § 56; [3, 5-7] Statutes, § 74; [4] Statutes, §73;
[9] ConstItutIonal Law, § 156; [10] Constitutional Law §§ 156
164; [11] Constitutional Law, § 163; [12] Statutes, § 33. '
,
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decision that is the law of the case, however, Is made in anticipation of further litigation, and is intended not as a final
dete.rmination of the rights of the parties but as a guide upon
~etrIal. ~t. does not foreclose the consideration of new legal
Issues arISIng from changes in the evidence or pleadings
(Cowell v. Snyder, supra; Bayer v. Barrett, 127 Cal.App.
~05 [15P.2d 801] ; 5 C.J.S. 1508; 2 Cal.Jnr. 951), and there
IS no reason why it should foreclose the presentation of issues
not previously considered.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WESTERN
FRUIT GROWERS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent; W. B. PARKER, as Director of Agriculture, etc.,
et al., Cross-Defendants and Appellants.
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be re-enacted, and published at length as revised or amended,
is to he' reasonably construed and limited in application to
the sp~cific, evil which such provision was designed toroniedy. It is, not to, be used as,a weapon for s~riking down
'legislation which may not reasonably be said ,to have been
enacted contrary to the specified, method.
[4] Id.-Amendment-Modes, of Altering Statute.--Incomplying
withConst., art. IV,§ 24, the Legislature' may use either an '
existing statute or a section of it as the basis for changing
an existing law. The decision as to which unit is to be used
is one to be made by the Legislature in its discretion, and its
'determination will not be questioned by the courts.
[5] Id.-Amendment-Rc-enactment and Repllblication.-While
abstractly there may be differences in meaning between the
words "revise" and "amend," they arc ,interchangeable in the
sense in which they are used in' ponst., art~ IV,§ 24; in .
either case the revising or amending 'act is intended asa substitute for the original stntuteor section, continuing. in force
that which is re-enacted and repealing .what is omitted.
[6] Id.-Amendment-Re-enactment and R~publication.-If the
Legislature elects to change a statute by the method'ofsection~bycsection amendment, no constitutional violation occurs
so long as each section is published and re-enacted at length,
,r«:igardless of the num:ber of sections so changed.
.. [7]' Id..~Amendmcnt-Re-enactment. and Republication-Agricultural Products Marketing Act.......lnasmuch as the title.of Agri~
cultural Products Marketing Act of 1937 .recites :that it is
"An 'act .to amend" the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935
"by amendmg" enumerated sections' "to add a new section .••
and' to repeal" certai:n sections of· the 1935 .law,the. Legislature intended· to use thesection-by-section amendment 'procedure, and as it published lEip,gth the sections as, amended,
there was no violation of the mandate of Const.;art. .rV;§24.
. [Sa, Sb] A:griculture-Regulation-Agricultural· A:d3¥stment ~cts"
-Licenses-Validity-of Legisla.tion ContitJ.uiJlgLfcenses Pre-,
viously Issued.-Under the 1931 an.tlndmentto ~AgricU1turar
Adjustment Act of 1935" § 18, the continuance of licenses
theretofore issued by the Director of Agriculture. upon,.,dif- ~
ferentbut valid .conditions, without subjecting those operating
under such licenses to the·' new requireinents for' the issuance
of licenses in the future wider said amendments, did not constituteunreasonable class legislation.
[9] . Constitutional' Law-Equltl ;Protectionof Laws-Class Legis. lation-Reasonableness of Classification•.....:.The,constitutional
prohibition of special legislation does. not, preclude legislative
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